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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC, INC,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Brief of Respondent

vs.
JAMES LEWIS dba LEWIS ELECTRIC,

Case No. 900466-CA

Defendant/Appellant•
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal by the Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter
defendant) to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and Section 782-2, Utah Code Annotated

from the Judgment rendered by the

Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second Judicial District Court
in and for Weber County, State of Utah Civil No. 890903456. The
Utah Supreme Court referred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(j), Utah Code Annotated.
References to pleadings in the record are given by the
pleading title. No record numbers are given only transcript pages.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the judgment rendered by the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor after trial in this matter was erroneous, specifically:

a.

Whether there was a contract between the parties;

b.

If there was no contract between the parties could

the plaintiff/respondent

(hereinafter plaintiff) be held

responsible to the defendant for damages and/or loss profits
under a theory of promissory estoppel; and
c. Did defendant carry his burden of proof with respect
to damages and/or loss profits at the trial level in order to
recover any damages.
d. Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found
and determined by the trial Court correct.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of the appellate court relating to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (appendix ii) is fully set
forth in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it
states:
". . . . Findings of fact, whether based upon oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court If
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. . . .
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Grayson Roper LTD. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, (Utah 1989), page 470;
"... On the other hand, a trial court's
findings of fact are given deferential
review....To successfully attack a trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
first marshall all the evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack under the rule 52(a)
2

standard, [citations omitted]..."
The standard as it relates to the theory of promissory
estoppel is one of reasonableness and equity. (Chernick v. U.S.,
372 P.2d 492, (U.S. Ct.of Claims 1967; Tolboe Construction Company
v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P.2d 843, (Utah 1984).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (appendix
i).

The judgment and ruling of the trial court is set out in the

appendix, (appendix iii).
STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF CASE
This was a lawsuit concerning breach of contract claims
asserted by both the plaintiff and defendant and an additional
claim under the theory of promissory estoppel asserted by the
defendant.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff sued defendant for the sum of $1,434.83 on an open
account on a project known as the Ogden Tabernacle Job. Defendant
counterclaimed against the plaintiff for an offset on the Ogden
Tabernacle Job and brought a new claim against the plaintiff on a
project known as the Weber State College Job for breach of contract
and/or under the theory of promissory estoppel for the sum of
$15,000.00 plus costs, interest and other relief.

Plaintiff

replied to the counterclaim of the defendant stating that defendant
was entitled to no offset on the Ogden Tabernacle Job.
3

On the

Weber State College Job plaintiff claimed that there was no breach
of contract as no contract existed between the parties and that
defendant could not recover under the theory of promissory estoppel
as he acted unreasonably

and imprudently when he used a mistaken

and incorrect price quote given to the him by the plaintiff.
Defendant was informed and knew of the mistake prior to him using
the price quote in a bid he was preparing wherein he was seeking
the contract for the Weber State College job.
Plaintiff and defendant proceeded with discovery in this
matter up to trial. Plaintiff motioned for continuances in this
matter due to the failure of defendant to provide discovery, which
motions were denied by the trial court. Trial was held in April,
1990, for two days, before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor,
presiding without a jury.
DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT
On the Ogden Tabernacle Job, the trial court granted some of
defendants offsets totaling $587.50 and awarded a judgment to the
plaintiff for the remaining balance of it's claim in the sum of
$826.13.

Defendant states in his brief, for the first time, that

this part of the judgment is not being appealed.

Plaintiff now

asks the court to reaffirm the trial courts ruling in this matter
with regards to the Ogden Tabernacle Job.
On the Weber State College Job the Court ruled that there was
no cause of action on defendants counterclaims as there was no
contract between the parties. There was no acceptance by defendant
of the prices quoted to him by the plaintiff prior to the time the
4

plaintiff withdrew the price quotes.

The trial court also ruled

that the requirements of promissory estoppel were not met as
defendant could not reasonably rely upon the prices given by the
plaintiff once they were withdrawn by the plaintiff prior to the
bid deadline.
For the remaining sections of this brief the Weber State
College Job will be referred to as only "the job", as the appeal
concerns only that project and the actions relating thereto.
RELEVANT FACTS
1. Defendant is a resident of Weber County, State of Utah and
a duly licensed electrical contractor under the laws of the State
of Utah and was doing business as Lewis Electric at all times
relevant to the issues before the Court. (Amended Counterclaim #11,
R.

, T. Vol I, p.19).
2.

Plaintiff is a corporation authorized to do business

within the State of Utah. (Amended Counterclaim #2, R. , Affidavit
of Donald Wilhelm #8, R. , T.Vol II, p.30).
3.

In or about July, 1988 Defendant became aware of work to

be performed at Weber State College , the job, and obtained plans
and specifications relating to this project. (Depo. of Defendant,
P.21, L 1-25; R.
4.

T. Vol I, p.54.).

Defendant after review of the plans and specifications

relating to the job prepared a list of supplies, materials, and
anything else defendant assessed would be needed for the job. This
is called a "take-off". (Depo of Defendant P.13,L.22, P.25,L.1-13.;
R.

;T.Vol I, p.55; T. Vol II, p.13-14).
5

5.

The job was to be bid before 10:00 a.m. on July 20, 1988

at the bid depository located at approximately 12th Street and 500
West

in

Ogden, Utah,

approximately

eleven

blocks

from

the

defendants office. (Appendix v.,T.Vol I, p. 55,58,85).
6.

Approximately

one week prior to the bid deadline,

plaintiff prepared and delivered to the defendant a "bill of
materials". (T.Vol I, p.55-56) This is a list of the material that
a supplier, here the plaintiff, believes will be needed for the
job. It contains no prices. Based upon this bill of materials, the
supplier, here the plaintiff, will give a price quote on the day
the bid is due to the contractor, here the defendant. (Depo of
Pusey, P.9-11, R.

, Depo of Defendant P.25, L.4-24; R. ;T.Vol I,

p.55; T. Vol II p.14-15).
7.

On July 20, 1988 defendant began preparing his bid to be

submitted to the bid depository.

(Appendix v.,T.Vol

I, p.59)

Defendant had to make one original bid and then make eleven copies
to be submitted

to

10 general contractors, one to the bid

depository and one for his file. (T. Vol I,p.58).
8.

On

July

20, 1988 defendant

began

telephoning

the

suppliers, including the plaintiff, to received price quotes from
them as it related to the prepared bill of materials and the job.
(T.Vol I,p.59).
9.

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on July 20, 1988 plaintiff

quoted to the defendant the price of $213,400.00 for this job. (T.
Vol II, p.19-20; T.Vol I,p.59,85).

A different price was quoted

to him by a second electrical supplier, Electrical Wholesale, for
6

this job at a total price 5.9% higher than the figure given by the
plaintiff. (T.Vol I, p.87). No discussions about awarding the
contract to the plaintiff were held at this time by the plaintiff
nor the defendant, just an exchange of numbers. (T. Vol II,p.20)
10.

At approximately 9:50 a.m. on July 20, 1988 plaintiff

called the defendant back, and speaking with Mr. Lewis personally,
told him that the price quote given to him previously was incorrect
and that the correct price was $222,400.00. Plaintiff told the
defendant that it could not honor the lower price but would be
willing to do the work at the higher price. (T.Vol I, p.85; T. Vol
II, p.21-23,50-51) .

Defendant denies the statement that the

plaintiff was willing to do the work at the higher price.

Again

no discussions were held between the plaintiff and the defendant
with regards to awarding the contract to the plaintiff. (T. Vol II,
p.25)
11.

During the telephone call at 9:50 a.m. on July 20, 1988

defendant informed plaintiff that it was too late to change the
figures on the bid and he was going to submit the bid as he had
prepared

it using

plaintiff's

incorrect

prices, even though

defendant only had to change two numbers, make the copies at his
office, with the help of two other people, and then drive to the
bid depository. (T.Vol I, p.99-100)
drivers

The other two people had

licenses and could have helped drive.(T.Vol

I,p.86).

Defendant then left his office, drove to the bid depository and
deposited the bid, even though defendant knew of the mistake by the
plaintiff. (T.Vol I, p.60,64). The bid was deposited at 9:59 a.m.
7

(T.Vol I, p.64).
12.

Defendant had many options once he became aware of the

mistake by the plaintiff.

He could have not submitted his bid,

withdrawn his bid after deposit and at any time prior to the time
the contract was awarded or he could have made corrections, by
crossing out the numbers and submitting the corrected bid. (T. Vol
II, p. 29). Defendant claims he could not withdraw his bid after
deposit or make the corrections by crossing out prior to deposit.
13.

Plaintiff attempted to contact the defendant after the

bid deadline to see if he was going to award the contract to the
plaintiff and if so, when was plaintiff going to begin the job with
the defendcint. (T. Vol II, p.21-22; T. Vol II, p. 44,46-48) .
14.

Defendant was awarded the contract on his bid as he was

the low bidder by a 6% margin. (T.Vol I, p.66-67, 93-95).
15. Defendant deposited the bid because he needed the job and
he was hoping that he could get relief from the prices. (T.Vol I,
p. 64).
16.

Defendant thereafter did not retain the plaintiff to

supply the electrical material and plaintiff did not furnish any
of

the electrical material

Defendant

used

two

other

on the
electrical

job.

(T. Vol

suppliers

for

II, p.27).
the job,

Whitehead Electric and Electrical Wholesale.(T.Vol I,p. 3,70,74).
The total cost to the defendant at the time of trial was higher
than the corrected price of the plaintiff. The job was not rebid
by the defendant. (T. Vol I,p.88-94).
17.

As of the date of the trial the job was not complete.
8

(T. Vol I,p.53,70,103).
18.

There is no written contract between the parties.

(Affidavit of Donald Wilhelm #10, R.
19.

, T. Vol II,p.91).

On August 26, 1988, defendant mailed a letter to the

plaintiff explaining his problems with Plaintiff, (appendix iv,
T.Vol I,p.68-69).
20.

Defendant did not provide any evidence of the profit or

loss it received at the completion of the job. Plaintiff objected
to the evidence which was presented at trial by the defendant. The
court reserved ruling upon plaintiff's objections and never did
rule upon them. (T.Vol I, p.75-84).

Defendant testified that it

wanted fifteen percent profit on the job at trial due to the
aggravation he suffered is going to court (T.Vol I,p.96) even
though later he testified that the job was calculated for a five
percent profit. (T.Vol I,p.96-98).
21.

Defendant performed under the awarded contract on the

job. Defendant was paid in full on the job as well as his
suppliers. (T.Vol I, p.104-106).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff argues that there was no contract between the
plaintiff

and

the defendant.

Further, that

the

theory of

Promissory Estoppel does not apply in this case as defendant could
not reasonable rely upon a mistake he knew existed to the detriment
of the plaintiff and even if promissory estoppel applied, that the
defendant failed to establish any damages or mitigate his damages.
9

The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court
are correct and should be affirmed.

DETAILS OF ARGUMENT
A. There is no contract between the plaintiff and defendant.
Judge Taylor held that in this matter there was no contract.
It is basic contract law that a contract requires an offer, an
acceptance and consideration.

There was at least

no acceptance

in this matter and at most no acceptance and no consideration.
Defendant received two price quotes on the day the bid was
due.

One of the price quote came from the plaintiff and the other

came from another electrical supplier.

There were no words of

acceptance and no exchange of consideration.

Defendant never did

say that he would accept the prices of the plaintiff. (Depo. of
Defendant, p.31,L.1-4).

In fact the plaintiff contacted defendant

after the bid deadline to see if they had a contract.
If the court interprets the price quote of the plaintiff as
an offer then the offer was withdrawn prior to acceptance by the
defendant.

The general rule is stated in 17 C.J.S., Contracts,

Sec.50, page 707-708, states:
"A subcontractor cannot withdraw from his
agreement after the contractor has accepted the
subcontractor's bid, although the principal
contract has not yet been awarded.
•

Before acceptance. As a general rule, an
offer, if not under seal or supported by a
consideration, may be revoked or withdrawn at
any time before it is accepted and the
acceptance is communicated when communication
10

is necessary, for until then there is neither
agreement or consideration.... if both parties
meet, one prepared to accept and the other to
retract, whichever speaks first will have the
law with him; and this question is one of fact
to be decided by the jury, [emphasis added].'1
Clearly there is no contract between the parties and the judge,
acting as the finder of fact found that the plaintiff acted first
to withdraw his offer, that the defendant did not communicate his
acceptance of the offer.
If the Court determines that there is a valid contract between
the parties then plaintiff has asserted defenses which should bar
the enforcement of the contract.
The first defense was the one of mitigation of damages. After
the plaintiff was not allowed to perform under the contract at
either price the defendant did not rebid the job, but went with the
prices he had been given by the other electrical supplier,
Electrical Wholesale, on the day the bid was due. He also bought
other items from a second supplier, also without biding. The price
quote from Electrical Wholesale was greater than even the higher
price quote of the plaintiff by approximately $3,600.00 (T. Vol I,
p. 88-93) and the combined price from both suppliers used by the
defendant to do the work was, based upon the allegations of the
defendant, greater than the higher price of the plaintiff by at
least $15,000.00.

The defendant did not ask the State for any

claims review or any other relief from the contract.
The second defense asserted was waiver and estoppel.
The actions of the defendant set forth in the facts section, infra,
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and the statements in the argument relating to promissory estoppel,
supra, could clearly allow the court to determine

that the

defendant waived his rights to any claims under the contract and
he is estopped from seeking enforcement of the contract.

B. Defendant is not entitled to
recover from the plaintiff under the
theory of promissory estoppel.
Since there is no contract between the parties, defendant is
asking the court to imply one under the theory of promissory
estoppel.

The Utah Supreme Court has been very active concerning

this theory of recovery.
In Tolboe Const, v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P.2d 843,
(Utah, 1984), a contractor commenced an action to recover damages
from a subcontractor for the subcontractor refusing to perform
paving work according to a bid submitted to the contractor.

The

Utah Supreme Court ruled in favor of the subcontractor and in
ruling clearly stated what is required
promissory estoppel.

for a recovery under

They declared at page 845-846:

"[Promissory estoppel] is a doctrine of equity
which the [defendant] could claim the benefit
of only by showing the facts required to
justify its application. These would include
that the [plaintiff was] aware of all the
material facts; that in such awareness they
made the promise when they knew that the
[defendant] was acting in reliance on it; that
the latter, observing reasonable care and
prudence, acted in reliance on the promise and
got into a position where it suffered a loss.
Under such circumstances, equity recognizes the
unfairness of permitting withdrawal of the
promise and will enforce it. [emphasis added. ]"
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The Supreme Court continued latter on by saying:
11

[K]knowledge by one party that the other is
acting under mistake is treated as equivalent
to mutual mistake for purpose of rescission.
[Citations omitted. ] Relief from mistaken bids
is consistently allowed when one party knows
or has reason to know of the other's error and
the requirements for rescission are fulfilled.
[Emphasis added.]"
Also, in Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 387 P.2d 1000, (Utah
1964) the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to enforce a mistaken subcontractors bid
because the contractor knew or should have know of the mistake by
the subcontractor.
Defendant did not "observe reasonable care and prudence11 in
acting upon the alleged promise of the plaintiff.
Defendant was told personally prior to the bid deadline that
the prices quoted by the plaintiff were incorrect.

Defendant was

given a new price for the material. Defendant chose to ignore the
new prices and take his chances with the mistaken prices. He was
told that plaintiff would not do the work for the lower price.
Defendant submitted his bid in the hope that he would get the job
and then be able to get the material for the lower price because
he needed the work.
Defendant could have attempted to change the figures on the
bid he intended to deposit with the bid depository.

The mistake

by the plaintiff was a $9,000.00 error which could easily be
recalculated, including the new taxes and overhead.

If the

defendant was worried about the taxes and overhead, (which should
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not have changed from the first calculation) then he could have
just added $10,000.00 to the bid and counted the rest as profit.
He would have had to change at most two numbers on the bid form,
(appendix v), made eleven copies and then he and his employees who
were there helping him, could have driven to the bid depository,
one driving and the other placing the new bid in the prepared
envelopes

to

be deposited.

Defendant

could

have

made the

corrections on the original bid form. He did not have to make out
a new bid form.
There

is also

testimony

that

the defendant

could

have

withdrawn his bid prior to the acceptance by the General Contractor
without any liability.

Defendant decided not to do this in hopes

of doing the work.
The actions of the defendant were not reasonable or prudent
under the circumstances.

He took a risk, knowing of the mistake,

and the risk did not pay and now he is asking the court to charge
the risk to the plaintiff.

There was no detrimental reliance on

the part of the defendant.
If the Court feels that a contract should be implied, then
plaintiff asserts that it's enforcement should be barred due to the
defenses raised by the plaintiff, which are failure of defendant
to mitigate his damages and the actions of the defendant are enough
to establish a waiver and estoppel as explained infra.
The defendant relies upon the case of Gerson Electric Const.
Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 726, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 1983).
This case is distinguishable from the present case.
14

In Gerson, a

electrical contractor brought an action against an electrical
subcontractor supplier for lost profits allegedly caused by the
subcontractor supplier's refusal to perform pursuant to it's
submitted bid that resulted in the contractor being forced to
withdraw its low bid after it was awarded the contract.

The

contractor stated that it was impossible to substitute another
subcontractor once the time for submitting his bid had lapsed. The
contractor and the subcontractor had met together prior to the time
the bids were due to design a proposed system for the project, as
it was a specialized project. The subcontractor then gave a price
to the contractor for the project, which the contractor used and
incorporated into his bid which was submitted. The contractor was
awarded the contract and subsequent to the award of the contract,
the subcontractor refused to perform unless it was for a higher
price. The subcontractor did not claim any mistake was made on the
first price quote. The contractor was then allowed to withdraw his
bid and sue for loss profits due to the fact it could not perform
the contract due to the specialized design of the system by the
subcontractor

and

the

fact

subcontractor on this job.

that

it

could

not

replace

the

The court held that the contractor

could recover under a theory of promissory estoppel as it is
defined in Illinois for lost profits.
This is different from the case at bar by the following facts:
In Gerson the subcontract was a specialized one, not a contract
concerning common items; in Gerson the subcontractor submitted his
price and the contractor submitted his bid and only after the
15

contract was awarded did the subcontractor refuse to perform, in
the case at hand the subcontractor informed the contractor of the
mistake prior to the contractor submitting his bid; in Gerson the
subcontractor did not allege any mistake unlike the present case;
and there were other subcontractors that could have done the work
in the

present

case

unlike

the

Gerson

case.

Further

the

contractor, according to the Illinois Appellate court held that he
did all that he could to mitigate his damages which is not the case
between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant did not
mitigate his damages.

The Court in Illinois also applied it's

interpretation of the theory of promissory estoppel as developed
in Illinois, not the one defined

by numerous Utah Court decision.

This case is not controlling and should not be used as a precedent.
The defendant also uses the case of John Price Associates,
Inc. v. Warner Elec. Inc., 723 F.2d 755 (U.S. Ct. of App., 10 Cir.,
1983)

to

support

itfs

claims.

This

is

a case where

the

subcontractor attempted to withdraw its bid after the contract was
awarded

and

after

the

contractor

had

given

notice

to

the

subcontractor that it T ms going to rely upon the prices of the
subcontractor.

The contractor also did not know of any alleged

mistake by the subcontractor prior to the time it submitted its
bid. The contractor also did act reasonably according to the court
to mitigate it's damages.
the present matter.

This is clearly not the same facts as

The defendant had actual knowledge of the

mistake and the bid was withdrawn prior to the time the contractor
was going to submit his bid. No notice was given to the plaintiff
16

that the defendant was going to rely upon the price quote of the
plaintiff. Defendant did not mitigate his damages.
Plaintiff questions whether the defendant suffered any loss
due to the actions of the plaintiff as alleged by the defendant.
The theory of promissory estoppel requires that defendant suffer
a loss.

Defendant has stated that all the suppliers to the job

used by him have been paid and that he was paid in full.

He does

claim that he has loss some profits, which even at trial were
calculated at a different rate than on the bid or during discovery.
(T. Vol I, p.96-98). At the time of trial the job was not finished
and there could be no manner in which the lost profits could be
calculated with certainty.

Even if the defendant had taken the

higher price of the plaintiff the defendant would have been the low
bidder on the job, be awarded the contract, and had to spend less
money to complete the job.

C. Defendant did not carry his burden of proof.
Defendant failed to carry it's burden of proof as to damages.
Plaintiff requested from the defendant invoices on the job in order
to determine what, if any damages, the defendant may have suffered
due to the actions of the plaintiff. This was requested during the
discovery period of the pending lawsuit and at the pretrial.

At

the time of trial, plaintiff still had not received all of the
invoices requested. This was due to the fact that the job was not
totally completed and some alleged problems with the mail.

The

prayer in the counterclaim asks for $15,000.00; at trial, the
17

defendant ask for $15,221.50 plus interest, loss profits, and
costs, now on appeal defendant is asking for $15,221.50 as over
charges and lost profits of about $23,261.00. Defendant does not
even know what the damages are, if any, in this matter.

The

profits were calculated at different rates at different times
during this proceeding as mentioned above. Plaintiff motioned the
court to continue the trial until the job was completed, which was
denied.

Plaintiff then objected to the invoices being presented

at trial as they were not provided to the plaintiff according to
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and previous orders
of the Court.

This objection was reserved, but not ruled upon by

the court. (T. Vol I, p. 75-84).

D. The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law are correct.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law given by the court
are not erroneous and should not be disturbed pursuant to the
standard found in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Conclusions of Laws are found in the appendix (appendix
ii).

CONCLUSION
The rulings of the trial court should not be disturbed and
the judgment should be affirmed. There was no contract between the
parties and no contract should be implied by the theory of
promissory estoppel due to the unreasonable and imprudent acts of
the defendant.

Defendant has repeatedly failed to show any loss
18

or damage.

As stated in

Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d

1 (Utah 1989) by the Utah Supreme Court, " a mistake . . . may not
be exploited by one party to take advantage of the other."
Defendant should not be entitled to take advantage of the mistake
of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff should be entitled to recover it's

costs in this appeal.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 1991,

Jones
Atjtorhiy for P l a i n t i f f /
R€(jspomalent
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State, Suite 2650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of plaintiff/respondents
brief, postage prepaid, by U.S. Mail this

14th day of June, 1991

to the attorney for the defendant/appellant, La Var Stark at 2485
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401.

lyle W./Jones
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respofoaent
Benetfacial Life Tower
36 South State, Suite 2650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.

—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judicial review.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facta by jury.
Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.

Kyle W. Jones 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street, Suite 2650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-7771
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs,
JAMES LEWIS dba LEWIS
ELECTRIC,
Defendant,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 890903456
Judge: Stanton M. Taylor

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
trial in the above-entitled court, before the Honorable Judge
Stanton M. Taylor, on Tuesday, April 24, 1990 and Wednesday,
April 25, 1990 at the hours of 1:30 p.m. and 9:30 a.m.
respectively. Kyle W. Jones appeared for and on behalf of the
Plaintiff and LaVar Stark appeared for and on behalf of the
defendant.
Plaintiff was also present by its representatives
and the defendant was present.
The courts records and file in this matter, and the
sworn testimony of the parties and witnesses having been duly
considered and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now
makes and enteres the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff is a corporation authorized to do business
in the State of Utah.
2. Defendant is a resident of Weber County, State of
Utah and is doing business in Weber County as Lewis Electric.
3. Defendant owed to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,413.63
under a contract between them concerning a project that concerned
the Ogdea Tabernacle located in Weber County.

4. Defendant suffered substantial delays on the
Ogden Tabernacle project and that Defendant was damaged by
reason of those delays.
5. Defendant was responsible to field cut and trim
as needed , all materials furnished under the Norton Ceiling
plans on the Ogden Tabernacle project.
6. Defendant signed a document agreeing to field
cut and trim all materials from Norton Ceilings and those
plans became an integral part of the contract. Defendant was
under no obligation to accept this condition but choose to
accept the condition.
7. Defendant is not entitled to claim as an offset of
any of the expenses that relate to the cutting and trimming
of the Norton Ceiling grid.
8. Defendant is entitled to only an offset on the
Ogden Tabernacle project in the amount of $587.50. Defendant
is not entitled to recover anything additional as claimed
in the pleadings on the Ogden Tabernacle project.
9. Defendant owes to the Plaintiff the sum of
$826.13 on the Ogden Tablernacle project.
10. There was no contract between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant concerning the dealings between them on the Weber
State College project. There was no offer and no acceptance
of the prices on the Weber State College project.
11. If there was an offer by the Plaintiff in this
matter then the Plaintiff had the right to withdraw its
offer any time prior to acceptance, and this is what the
plaintiff attempted to do prior to the bid deadline of 10:00
a.m. on the morning of the date the bid from defendant was due.
12. Defendant knew the figure received from the
plaintiff concerning the prices for supplies in the Weber State
College project were wrong but he choose to submit them
anyway in his bid.
13. Defendant was personally aware of the wrong
prices.
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14. Defendant submitted his bid, with the wrong
prices, based upon the hope that he would be able to get the
material for the lower price.
15. Defendant did not reasonable rely upon the wrong
prices given to him by the Plaintiff. Defendant could not
rely upon the first^praybor figure of $213,400 when he knew it
was a wrong figure.
16. Defendant has suffered no detrimental reliance
due to the actions of the plaintiff concerning the Weber State
College project.
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiff is entitled to Judgment on its
complaint in the sum of $826.13. This is based upon the fact
that defendant owed to the plaintiff the sum of $1,413.63 on
an open account but due to the actions of the plaintiff, is
entitled to an offset to this sum in the amount of $587.50.
2. That defendant is entitled to an offset,
under the claims set forth in its second cause of action stated
it's counterclaim and under it's affirmative defense stated
in it's answer, to Plaintiff's open account claims in the amount
of $587.50.
3. That the Court finds no cause of action under
defendants First Cause of Action found in it's Counterclaim,
concerning the Weber State College Project. There was no
contract between the parties and since defendant had
no detrimental reliance and could not reasonable rely upon the
mistaken price figure given to him, but later changed prior to
the bid deadline of the defendant, that there is not a
promissory estoppel claim in this matter.
4. Each party will bear their own costs in this
matter.
DATED this
day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

THE COURT: Well, starting with the
complaint, I think everyone agreed that the amounts paid
under the contract were not paid under the contract.
Let's see. That figure was $1,413.63.

Since that was the

agreement of the parties the Court finds in fact that was
the amount that was not paid under the —

under the

contract.
Concerning the counterclaims —
counterclaims —

there are two basic

I'm going to take them in reverse order.

The second counterclaim relating to the Weber State
College job, you know, I have some kind of bad feelings
about it.

I frankly have a lot of sympathy for Mr. Lewis'

position on it, but I think from the standpoint of the
law, Graybar's going to prevail.
I think there is a distinction between what's moral
and what's legal, and it seems to me that if somebody
calls up and says, we'll do it for a certain price, that
they should —

they should do it for a certain price.

From the standpoint of the law, there is no —

there

is obviously no contract because a contract requires offer
and acceptance and there's no offer, or there's no
acceptance.

A bid is in the nature of an offer, and

there's actually no acceptance of that offer until
after —

after the contract is accepted by the general or

the general receives the bid and then accepts the
-2iii

1

subcontract and so on.

2

And under the law of contracts, any time a party to a

3

contract wants to withdraw, they have a right to withdraw

4

an offer any time prior to acceptance.

5

6

I think

that's where the doctrine of Promissory Estoppel comes
J into play because of situations like this.

7
8

That's —

It's not the

classic offer/acceptance situation.
I

9

Under Promissory Estoppel if somebody submits a bid
relying upon that bid, the Court's going to come along

10 I later and say, well, we're —
11

we're going to estop the

—

the subcontractor from denying the fact that they have

—

12 I that they have made a bid at a particular figure and that
13

the contractor relied upon that bid.

14 J

The thing that's lacking in this case, of course, is

15

the reliance.

16

and indicated to him that it was a mistake and that they

When —

when Graybar contacted Mr. Lewis

17 | could not go with the lower bid, when he submitted his bid
18

1 then he wasn't relying upon that —

there wasn't the

19 I detrimental reliance that would be normally required in a
20
21 J
22

Promissory Estoppel situation.
He submitted his bid based upon a hope that he would
be able to —

to get the material for the lower price, but

23 I in this case it appears to be a vain hope.

So Promissory

24 J Estoppel will fail based on the fact that there wasn't a
25

reliance upon the Graybar figure, that's the $213,400.

-3-

So

1

2
3
4
5
6
7

I the Court reluctantly finds no cause on the second action
or the second cause of action.
On the first cause, the Court finds that there was
substantial delays, and that Mr. Lewis was damaged by
reason of those delays.
bound by the —
the —

But once again, the Court is

the documents that have been submitted and

the primary document that —

that damages

8

Mr. Lewis7 claim is the document from Norton containing

9

the plans, which was signed by Mr. Lewis, wherein it was

10

stated, all materials furnished in standard length sizes

11

to be field cut and trimmed as needed by contractor.

12

I think that becomes an integral part of the

13

contract.

14

about that, the fact that he had to get the materials and

15

had to get started on it, but I guess he didn't have to

16

accept that as a condition if he chose not to.

17

And I recognize the concern that Mr. Lewis had

Therefore, the offset does not include any of the

18

expenses that relate to the —

19

and so forth of the —

20

through the exhibits and believes that if I exclude those

21

22
23

the cutting and trimming

of the grid.

The Court has gone

| amounts that the offset that M r . Lewis will be entitled

to

w o u l d a m o u n t to $ 5 8 7 . 5 0 .
So t h e C o u r t is g o i n g t o a l l o w an o f f s e t t o

that

24

extent against the $1,413.63.

25

s o m e e x t e n t p r e v a i l e d and t o s o m e e x t e n t f a i l e d , t h e

-4-

A n d w h e r e e a c h p a r t y h a s to
Court

1
2

will order that both part ies bear there own costs.
Have I neglected anything?

3

MR. JONES:

4

question then.

5

$1,413.63?

6

If I can just ask one quick

The $587. 50 is just an offset to the

THE COURT:

That'rs right.

9

THE COURT:

That's right.

10

MR. JONES:

Thank you.

11

THE COURT:

Court's in recess.

12

MR. JONES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

7
8

13

differenced

(WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings concluded.)

14
15
6
7
8
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oLewid Electric

L^ompany.

ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS
August 26, 1988
B11 I Kuykendal I
Branch Manager
Graybar E l e c t r i c Supply,
2841 South 900 West

EXHIBIT

Inc.

P.O. Box 25718

DATE
WITNESS

~£
^

-

^

O

lx^S<3

CARIIEE9USTIN, RPR/NOTARY

Salt Lake City, Utah 84125
Re: Weber State Col lege, Physical Education Facility.
Dear Bill,
1 would like written confirmation of the telephoee call Kerry
Pusey made to me the other day regarding this project. Also a
clearer understanding of your reasons.
The job was to be bid at 10:00 A.M. Earlier, and In time to use
your price I received a price of $213,400.00. At approximately seven
minutes to ten, I received another 'call when he said they had made a
mistake and the price should be $222,400.00.
I told him it was too late for me to open all the bids, change
the prices, and make it in time to the bid depository.
When it appeared that I was the low bidder, I received at least
six calls from him the first week asking v/hen he was going to get an
order. That he needed to know so that he could go back to the suppliers
and get some relief. I told him 1 did not have a contract and couldn't
give him an order until I did.
This week he was in again asking for the order. I told him to go
ahea^. The next day he called and said you wouldn't let him take the
order because the price was too low. He said nothing about even honoring his higher price.
When he called I had several other people in my office and was
unable to discuss it with him. Since then I have not been able to contact
Another thing I would like resolved h-*« the ccei di due me for a
starter coil 1 had to return because he shipped the wrong voltage and I
had to replace it. This was true of several of them. Before he got me
credit for the others I got two letters from your credit manager. Each
time, and several times, Kerry promised he would get it cleared up. I
did not realize your Credit department had been moved to Las Vegas, so
I couldn't understand why Kerry couldn't walk over to Skip's desk and
get it straightened out. The account has been "past due" because of this
for some months. Is this one of the reasons for your actions ?
Kerry still owes me credit for one starter coil f
Please give me a better understanding of your actions. In this
business I need my suppliers as much as you need me and 1 need my
customers. But if we cannot rely on each other's word, it leaves a
miserable way to do business.
The last time I saw Kerry he said he wanted to work with me on
bidding Hill Field jobs. Is that st i l*K tru^_ or isthat tabyo also ?
Why or why not ?
\ 7 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r^->w
cc: K e r r y ^ u s e y ^ ^
^
^ ^ h ^ ^ ^ O t < E
(801) 393-0942
O Q D £

1/4 J W£bf ALL,\.V«JLJ* bi~r^x b o l i E 101
SALT LAKE CITY, ITEAH 84119 975-0295

PROJECT: PHYSICAL EDUCATION FACILITY W.S.C
DATE:
JULY 20, 1988 3:00 PM
PLACE:
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
TO:

BID SERVICE JOB NO:88-43
DEPOSITORY CLOSING:
JULY 20, 1988 10:00 AM

!<£*-

ADDRESS:

ADDRESS:

ADDENDUMSJ

are acknowledged.

FOLD HERE - This-side to shew through window envelope.
\*fe prcpose to furnish, in accordance with Bid Service Rules and Procedures
all labor, materials, equiprent and applicable taxes necessary to ccrnplete
the Electrical Installation on the above project, as shewn on the drawings
and described in the specifications and written addeixhr^s, as follows:
GENERAL AND Sl?PUE*ENTAL CONDITIONS: as applicable to:
DIVISION 16 ELECTRICAL
SECTIONS: 16001
16070
16110
16120
16135
16136
16140
16145
16155
16160
1617"
16180
16181
16182

Electrical General Provisions
Electrical Connections for Equipment
Conduit Raceways
" "
Conductors and"Cables
Electrical Bcxes and Fittings
Supporting Devices
Wiring Devices
Busduct
Motor Starters
Panelboards
Motor Circuit and Disconnects
Overcurrant Protective Devices
Transformers
Switchgear and Switchboards

;

R\SE BID:

16183 Motor Control Centers
16184 Pcwer Factor Correction
16420 Service Entrance
16452 Grounding
16510 Interior and Exterior Buil'
Lighting
1§551 Exterior Area Lighting
16510 Emergency E l e c t r i c a l Syster
16721 F i r e Alarm & Detection Sys
16740 Telephone System (Raceways
16750 Sound Systeri
16782 Gym Exterior Door Security.

Syst^
16786 Clock & Program
16111 Raceway Systen

VSl. <t'9 ?

ALTEKiATE NO:, 3 Parking Ground Upgrade

l^OTE: Concrete Light Pole Bases are included in car 3ase bid as per Section 16551

NOTE: We respectfully point out provisions of the General Conditions relative to
paynent and retention will be expected in aur behalf.
EXHIBIT J L
PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE

DATE _ ^) - X
WITNESS

11

LCI.~>I

>

CARiLEE DUSTIN, RPR/NOTARY

llilS BID DOES NOT DELUDE:
Bond Premium
Prorated Cost of Utilities for Construction Purposes
Temporary Light and Pouer Facilities

My Bondang Capicity is adequate for this project.
J ? X

Tor Bond Verification call

Utah Contractors License Nur»ber
DATE SIGNED

O

YES X
Cost of Bond /

J7 T

NO
J~^>2*

C^JT * & ^H/

") v >-» - *% f

COMPANY

By Execution of this bid form, I certify U.nt I have reid the Rules and Procedures
ao;erninq the operation of the ^ tah Sib Contractors Bid Service as revised by Board
Action Ma y 1987 and all anrndnents thereto, and agree that I will abide by those Pule
and Procedures.

rrLPm*E N rSEP

J fy

gtCftPTloM :

f

/ /

- ^ /

r

* 6 j y *—

p0t,, /^#r

^

SI(?CD 3Y^

,«u(cUc jc/'iy

«'*«*,

.iwi± SlLclxic

f

Company

ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS

EXHIBIT

c^L

DATF 2- fr- <?i>

WITNESS L C ^ : ^

1597 South 1200 West
P O Box 2006
Ogden Utah &4404
(801) 393-0941

CARILEE DUSTIN, RPR/NQTARY
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